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The United States Posture Toward the
Law of the Sea Convention:
Awkward but not Irreparable
ELLIOT L. RICHARDSON*
The author describes the United States position toward the
Convention as disappointing. Having declined to sign the Con-
vention, the United States surrendered global stability for ideo-
logical purity. The immediate costs of this position include
isolation from direct decision-making in the Preparatory Com-
mission. However, the prospects of long-range detrimental effects
on United States oceanic and other global interests will, in the
author's view, bring about a reverse of President Reagan's
decision.
INTRODUCTION
On July 9, 1982, President Reagan announced that the United
States would not sign the Convention of the Third United Nations
Conference on the Law of the Sea, which had been adopted in
New York on April 30 by a vote of 130 to 4, with 17 abstentions.
The President's statement acknowledged that the Convention
would benefit a wide array of United States interests-the mobil-
ity of air and naval forces, commercial navigation, fisheries, envi-
ronmental protection, scientific research, the conservation of
marine mammals, dispute settlement, and more. The administra-
tion objected to only one of the Convention's seventeen parts-
that dealing with deep seabed mining. Within that part, the in-
* Ambassador at Large and Chairman of the United States Delegation to the
Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, 1977-1980; Chairman of
the Public Advisory Committee on the Law of the Sea; senior resident partner in
the Washington office of Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy, 1980 to date. The
views expressed herein are solely those of the author.
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compatibility with free-market principles of some of its provi-
sions, particularly those on technology transfer and the limitation
of seabed mineral production, was viewed as fatal to the whole
Convention. It is not likely, however, that these provisions will
ever be invoked.1
The Convention was opened for signature in Jamaica on De-
cember 10, 1982. It was signed by 117 nations. That number is suf-
ficient to bring into being the Preparatory Commission whose
charge will be to design the structures and staffing patterns of the
institutions mandated by the Convention and to draft the rules
and regulations governing the deep seabed mining regime.2 The
Convention will enter into force when sixty nations have ratified
it;3 given the broad support already in evidence, this could well
occur within the next five years.
The United States will then be faced with the question of
whether we can afford to remain outside the Convention. The
range of our oceanic interests is wider and deeper than that of
any other country. We would also gain more from the Convention
than any other country. As time goes on it will become increas-
ingly clear that even our deep seabed mining interests will be
hurt, not helped, by our staying out. And since our other oceanic
interests will also suffer, it seems inevitable that a more realistic
assessment of the costs of isolation will in due course bring about
a reversal of President Reagan's decision.
EVALUATION OF EXISTING UNITED STATES POLICY
As it stands now, our posture will continue to reflect a mixture
of disappointed hopes and avoided realities. The disappointment
stems from the fact that the text adopted in New York on April 30
did not come as close to meeting United States negotiating objec-
tives as it could and should have done. Had our delegation con-
centrated on obtaining the best possible Convention and not been
1. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, art. 151, Annex III, art.
5, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/122 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Convention]; see also
UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, COMPTROLLER GENERAL'S REPORT TO
THE CONGRESS, IMPEDIMENTS TO UNITED STATES INVOLVEMENT IN DEEP OCEAN MIN-
ING CAN BE OVERCOME (1982); Ratiner, The Law of the Sea: A Crossroads for Amer-
ican Foreign Policy, 60 FOREIGN AFF. 1006 (1982); L. Antrim & J. Sebenius,
Incentives for Ocean Mining Under the Law of the Sea Convention (June 1982)
(unpublished manuscript).
2. Draft Final Act of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the
Sea, Annex I, res. I res. II, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/121 (1982) [hereinafter cited as
Draft Final Act]. As in the case of the rules and regulations drafted by the Inter-
nal Revenue Service to implement a tax statute, the rules and regulations gov-
erning the administration of deep seabed mining by the International Seabed
Authority will in many instances remove ambiguities and preclude worst-case in-
terpretations attributable to general language.
3. Convention, supra note 1, art. 308, para. 1.
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diverted by ideological pressures, it could have won significant
additional concessions. 4 As it was, we obtained valuable provi-
sions for preparatory investment protection (PIP) that Will give
the American companies that have pioneered deep seabed mining
guaranteed access to a specific minesite of up to 150,000 square ki-
lometers;5 we also gained the assurance of a seat on the Council
of the International Seabed Authority as well as certain other
marginally useful improvements.6
In deciding not to sign the treaty the President also decided not
to pursue the indications from several sources that opportunities
passed up in April might still be open at the Law of the Sea Con-
ference session to be held in New York on September 22-24, 1982,
to act on Drafting Committee recommendations. 7 Our failure to
take advantage of this last clear chance has made it all but certain
that the deep seabed mining regime that we shall eventually be
4. By the spring of 1982, a series of events-chiefly the election of President
Reagan, the change of Senate control, the abrupt announcement on the eve of the
Conference's reconvening in 1981 that the administration would review everything
that had gone on before, and the stonewalling that followed in Geneva later that
year-had brought the Conference to the point of readiness to make significant
concessions. Having participated in negotiating many of the compromises that the
Reagan administration sought to reopen, I could not myself play a direct part in
exploiting this opportunity. To take advantage of it, it was essential that we not,
by making excessive demands, undercut the opportunity to achieve the maximum
feasible gains. Although the deliberations of the Public Advisory Committee on
the Law of the Sea are confidential, I can appropriately confirm the general im-
pression that the committee, which included representatives of the deep seabed
mining consortia, was unanimous in this view. In the end, our advice was not fol-
loived. The turning point was the delegation's failure to pursue the opening cre-
ated by a group of western delegation heads known as the "Gang of 11" which
proposed a series of compromises that could have served as the basis of serious
negotiations. Eleventh Session of the Third United Nations Conference on the
Law of the Sea, A/CONF.62/L.104 (April 13, 1982) and A/CONF.62/L.104/Add.1
(April 14, 1982) [hereinafter "Gang of 11" Proposals]. For a restrained account of
this episode, see Ratiner, supra note 1. See also Whitaker, Outside the Main-
stream, THE ATLANTIc, Oct. 1982, at 22.
5. Draft Final Act, supra note 2, res. II, para. 1(e).
6. The assurance is, however, ambiguous since it guarantees the seat for the
"largest consumer" of seabed minerals without making clear whether the measure
is volume or value. The latter interpretation is necessary to assure the seat for the
United States, and it is clear that this was the interpretation intended by the Con-
ference. It can be made explicit in the rules and regulations. Other improvements
include the contract approval system for mining entities, a policy orientation of
the Authority more favorable to mineral production, and provision for the adop-
tion of rules and regulations for newly discovered seabed minerals which pre-
cludes a moratorium on these minerals. Ratiner, supra note 1, at 1016.
7. The message came, for example, early last summer from an informal meet-
ing of members of the "Gang of 11" and leaders of the Group of 77 held during the
regular session in Geneva of the International Law Commission.
obliged to join will be less satisfactory than it could have been.8
For as long as the decision stands, American companies will be
barred from access under the United States flag to the strategic
minerals of the deep seabed. Had the President's advisers faced
up to this fact, the outcome might well have been different. Lis-
tening instead to the Convention's most irreconcilable critics,
they embraced the illusion that assured access might somehow
be afforded by a reciprocating states agreement or "mini-treaty."9
They did so, moreover, despite the plain warnings to the contrary
contained in every responsible survey undertaken by the United
States Government, including a recent report by the General Ac-
counting Office.O These surveys had concluded that there would
be no "mini-treaty" for the simple reason that few, if any, of our
allies would join one. They also predicted that American compa-
nies will not operate under domestic legislation." Indeed, I have
yet to find a single representative of an American deep seabed
mining company willing to state publicly that his company is pre-
pared to take that risk.
The reason is clear. Domestic United States law cannot confer
on anyone a generally recognized legal right to exploit a defined
area of the seabed. But without such a right good for at least
twenty years, no rational investor will gamble $1.5 billion on a
deep seabed mining project.' 2 It will not suffice for seabed mining
8. The improvements lost include, at a minimum, less onerous provisions for
technology transfer (Convention, supra note 1, Annex 1II, art. 5) and relaxation of
the provisions for the adoption of amendments emanating from the Review Con-
ference (Convention, supra note 1, art. 155, para. 4). The surviving possibility of
additional concessions is touched on below.
9. A reciprocating states agreement would rest on national legislation provid-
ing for the recognition of claims by the enterprises of other States enacting similar
legislation. The States that have thus far enacted such legislation, in addition to
the United States, are the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Japan, and the
United Kingdom. Expressly reserving their right to join the Convention, the coun-
tries that have enacted seabed mining legislation, except Japan, on September 2,
1982, signed an agreement to consult for the purpose of resolving conflicts arising
from overlapping claims. See infra Agreement Concerning Interim Arrangements
Relating to Polymetallic Nodules of the Deep Sea Bed, Sept. 2, 1982 cited in Trea-
ties, Vol. 82, No. 2068 DEP'T ST. BuLi. 66 (1982) (reprinted in Appendix). A "mini-
treaty" would differ from a reciprocating states regime insofar as it would rest on a
formal treaty among deep seabed mining States. The concept was first publicly in-
troduced by Richard G. Darman, a member of the United States delegation to the
Law of the Sea Conference in 1977, in an article in Foreign Affairs which helped to
strengthen the impression that the United States had a realistic alternative to a
comprehensive treaty. See Darman, The Law of the Sea: Rethinking U.S. Interests,
56 FOREIGN AFF. 373 (1978).
10. UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, COMPTROLLER GENERAL'S
REPORT TO THE CONGRESS, IMPEDIMENTS TO UNTrED STATES INVOLVEMENT IN DEEP
OCEAN MINING CAN BE OVERCOME 3, 30-31 (1982).
11. Alexander, The Reaganites'Misadventure at Sea, FORTUNE, Aug. 23, 1982, at
129.
12. As generally understood, an integrated deep seabed mining project would
embrace not only a mining vessel and dredging equipment but vessels for trans-
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claims to be recognized only by a handful of like-minded coun-
tries. And even the seabed mining States concede that interna-
tional law would not require non-members of the reciprocal
regime to respect it.13
Thus, even if it were universally agreed that deep seabed min-
ing is a high seas freedom, such agreement would not provide a
secure legal foundation for investment; it would merely grant to
everyone the right to jump anyone else's claim. Only a few lead-
ing industrial countries, in any case, maintain that deep seabed
mining is a high-seas freedom. Those same countries have ac-
cepted the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice (ICJ).
They would accordingly face the ever-present risk-indeed, the
likelihood-that the ICJ will eventually declare that any deep sea-
bed mining activity that does not conform with the Convention is
illegal.14
porting manganese nodules from the mine site to a processing facility and the
processing facility itself. The prototypical project would generate an estimated
37,800 tons of nickel and proportional amounts of cooper, cobalt, and manganese,
given an assumed nodule content of 1.26% nickel, 1.03% copper, .25% cobalt, and
27.5% manganese. See Archer, Resources and Potential Reserves of Nickel and
Copper in Manganese, in MANGANESE NODULES: DIMENSIONS AND PERSPECTIVES
71, 77 (1979).
13. See Deepsea Ventures, Inc., Notice of Discovery and Claim of Exclusive
Mining Rights and Request for Diplomatic Protection and Protection of Invest-
ment (filed with Office of the Secretary, Dep't of State, Nov. 15, 1974) reprinted in
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, SENATE COMM. ON INTERIOR AND INSULAR AF-
FAIRS, 94TH CONG., 2D SEss., REPORT ON OCEAN MANGANESE NODULES app. E (1976).
For the State Department's announcement rejecting this claim, see id., App. F.
14. Ambassador T.T.B. Koh of Singapore, the President of the Conference, has
stated publicly that "I will take it upon myself to persuade the United Nations
General Assembly to adopt a decision asking the International Court of Justice for
an advisory opinion on whether such activities under unilateral national legisla-
tion are lawful, or are they illegal ... ." Text of press conference by T.T.B. Koh
given on May 3, 1982; see also Ratiner, supra note 1, at 1017. The conjecture that
the ICJ is likely to eventually declare deep seabed mining outside the Convention
to be illegal rests on the inferences drawn from: (a) the probable entry into force
of a widely accepted treaty purporting to establish an exclusive regime governing
access to the "common heritage of mankind"; (b) the fact that most countries have
regarded the deep seabed as off-limits to mining except pursuant to international
agreement ever since the adoption in 1969 by the United Nations General Assem-
bly of the Moratorium Resolution, G.A. Res. 2574, 24 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 30) at
10-11, U.N. Doc. A/7834 (1969) (adopted December 15, 1969); and in 1970 of the Dec-
laration of Principles, including the principle that the resources of the deep sea-
bed belong to the "common heritage," GJA. Res. 2749,25 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 28)
at 28, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970) (adopted December 17, 1970); and (c) an analysis of
the composition of the ICJ.
WORKING OUTSIDE OF THE CONVENTION
Though less good than it might have been and far from perfect,
the Convention's deep seabed mining regime is not unworkable.15
Depending upon metal-price prospects, at least some of the deep
seabed mining companies domiciled in other Western industrial
countries would be willing to operate under the Convention, and
they will have the encouragement of their governments in doing
so' 6 If, therefore, we remain outside the Convention, an Ameri-
can company that wishes to engage in deep seabed mining will
have no choice but to proceed under the flag of a country that has
joined the Convention.
Aware of this, industry representatives have lately begun to re-
vive the idea of a government guarantee against loss. But even if
Congress, which has previously rejected the idea, could be in-
duced to change its mind, it is inconceivable that such protection
could continue if the ICJ holds that all deep seabed mining not
sanctioned by the Convention is illegal.' 7 And since it is likely
that the court will so decide sooner than the full recovery of the
initial investments in deep seabed mining, which could easily
take ten years, a guarantee that did not cover this risk would be
worthless. It would in any case be anomalous if, having given
free-market principles precedence over all the many benefits of
the Convention, the United States were then to sacrifice those
same principles for the sole sake of access to deep seabed
minerals.
It is possible, of course, barring a sharp and predictably long-
term increase in metal prices, that legal and political uncertain-
ties will tip the scales against private investment in deep seabed
mining even under the Convention. In that event some form of
15. For a comparison with resource-extraction agreements between multina-
tional corporations and developing countries, see Katz, Financial Arrangementsfor Seabed Mining Companies: An NIEO Case Study, 13 J. WOnLD TRADE L. 209
(1979).
16. See, e.g., M. Dubs, Remarks at American Bar Association Meeting 65, 71-72
(San Francisco, California) (Aug. 9, 1982).
17. Such a guarantee was a feature of the deep seabed mining bills filed in
1977 and earlier. See, e.g., S. 2801, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); S. 1134, 93d Cong., 1st
Sess. (1973); S. 713, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); S. 2053, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.(1977); S. 493, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979). Late in 1977, however, when the Carter
administration decided that support of such legislation was essential to its negoti-
ating leverage and accordingly dropped the objections to the legislation which it
and previous administrations had consistently maintained, it did so on the condi-
tion that the indemnification provisions be eliminated. In exchange the industry
won language directing United States negotiators to seek a "grandfather" clause
protecting companies that had invested in deep seabed mining before the entry
into force of a treaty from any loss thereby caused. 30 U.S.C. § 1401 (Supp. 1981).
The preparatory investment protection (PIP) provisions of the Draft Final Act,
supra note 2, res. I, come close to fulfilling this directive.
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risk insurance would also be necessary. But the risks to be in-
sured against would be much less substantial than the risks of op-
erating outside the Convention.18 And though we would be
sacrificing ideological purity, we would gain in its place both con-
sistency and the advantages obtainable only under the
Convention.
As to the latter, the President's advisers avoided a second real-
ity. They downplayed the concern that United States isolation
could undercut our other oceanic interests. It could, for example,
endanger our national security interest in freedom of navigation
and overflight. It was to protect that interest that the United
States took the lead in calling for a new United Nations Confer-
ence on the Law of the Sea. We succeeded in persuading other
countries to respond to our navigational concerns only by agree-
ing to address their resource interests. This was the essence of
the '"package deal" pursued by the Conference from its beginning
in 1973.19 Just such a pioposal was embodied in the complex 200-
page document adopted in New York. If we persist in our present
course we shall be inviting the rest of the world to tell us that we
cannot expect to rely on the parts of the Convention we like while
at the same time rejecting the parts we don't like. The result, in-
stead of strengthening the rule of law, would make a mess of it-
at least for us.
Nor will this be the only non-mining cost of isolation. At the
Economic Summit meeting held in Paris on June 6, 1982, Presi-
dent Reagan agreed that the United States would participate in a
"global dialogue" on economic issues. Having turned our back on
the most comprehensive global dialogue thus far conducted, we
will have crippled our capacity to play a leading role in the next
rounds. Where shaping the multilateral institutions of the future
18. Richardson, Seabed Mining and Law of the Sea, Vol. 80, No. 2045 DEP'T ST.
BULL. 60 (1980). Any substantial chance that the ICJ might hold illegal exploita-
tion of the seabed not sanctioned by the Convention would in itself create a risk
more serious than the aggregate risks of operating under the Convention. If, as is
likely, recovery of the miner's initial investment will take ten years, even a 50-50
chance that such a judgment could be rendered within that period would make the
cost of insurance extremely high.
19. Report of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Sea-Bed and the
Ocean Floor Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction, 28 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No.
21), U.N. Doc. A/9021 (1973); see also U.S. About Face Termed 'Triumph Over Com-
monsense, " The Times of India, July 19, 1982, at 8, reprinted in 206 WoRLD WIDE
REPORT: LAW OF TE SEA 9 (1982).
is concerned, we cannot insist on having everything our own way
and still expect to be taken seriously.
CAN THE UNITED STATES "SALVAGE" THE CONVENTION?
Despite the United States' failure to take advantage of earlier
opportunities to obtain improvements in the Convention's deep
seabed mining provisions, an effort to win further concessions
even at this late date has been launched by friends of the Con-
vention who despair of its being ratified by the United States Sen-
ate in its present form but who also see the adverse consequences
for United States interests of our remaining outside it.20 It is diffi-
cult, however, to conceive of a process, short of the convening of a
whole new conference, that could make substantive changes in a
Convention that has already been opened for signature. And
even if this problem could be surmounted, it would be difficult to
obtain improvements going beyond those previously proposed by
the "Gang of 11,"21 and the Reagan administration has indicated
that it would not regard these as sufficient. The willingness, in
any case, of the rest of the world to solve the procedural issue and
then to make significant concessions depends on the importance
it attaches to United States participation. Although throughout
most of the Conference our only source of negotiating leverage is
the created impression that the United States could well afford to
go it alone, there is now an emerging awareness that our staying
out deprives those who join of nothing but our money. And since
it is also becoming clear that the Enterprise does not really need
to start out with 100% ownership of an entire integrated seabed
mining project,22 the prospect that our share of the Enterprise's
funding will be withheld is rapidly losing its capacity to inspire
alarm. Although for these reasons I do not dare to pin much hope
20. A leading role in this effort is being played by Professor John Norton
Moore, Director of the Center for Oceans Law & Policy at the University of Vir-
ginia. It is also being encouraged by members of the United States Senate, includ-
ing Senators Charles L Percy and Claiborne Pell, who have long supported the
effort to achieve a sound Law of the Sea treaty. See Hearings on the Nomination of
Kenneth Dam to be Deputy Sec'y of State Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Re-
lations, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 9, 42-47 (1982).
21. See "Gang of 11" Proposals, supra note 4.
22. The basic components of an integrated project are briefly described in note
12, supra. The States Parties to the Convention are obligated to participate, on a
basis proportional to their shares of the United Nations budget, in guaranteed
loans and interest-free advances to the Enterprise aggregating an amount suffi-
cient to finance one integrated project. Convention, supra note 1, Annex IV, art.
11, para. 3(a), (b). Given $1.5 billion as the estimated cost of such a project, the
United States share (25% of the total) would be $375 million. With the United
States out, the member States could agree to make available to the Enterprise
$1.25 billion instead of the full amount. While this might mean that the Enterprise
had to forego the purchase of, say, the transport vessels, that would not signifi-
cantly impair its capacity to carry out the role envisioned for it.
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on our being able to secure additional improvements at any early
date, the effort is certainly well worth pursuing, and I hope it will
be pursued.
It is not too late, meanwhile, to reverse our present position on
participating in the work of the Preparatory Commission. While
we cannot be a voting member of the Commission, we can as a
signatory of the Final Act participate as an observer,2 3 and that
will at least give us the opportunity to exercise some influence
over the content of the rules and regulations.24 And even though
the chances of our eventually adhering to the Convention were
rated as significantly lower than I rate them, we would be foolish
to renounce that opportunity.
In addition to serving both our basic national interest in global
stability and a long list of narrower concerns, the Convention
would also benefit our strategic interest in an alternative source
of nickel, copper, cobalt, and manganese. It would be ironic if, in
the name of that same interest, we handed over the exploitation
of seabed minerals to our industrial competitors.
CONCLUSION
The real importance of the Law of the Sea Convention cannot
be found either in the sum of its parts or in its extraordinarily
comprehensive whole. It lies rather in its demonstration of the
capacity of 160 sovereign States to work out rational accommoda-
tions among vital competing interests. This is an achievement
whose significance will loom ever larger as the world increasingly
finds itself forced to come to grips with its own inseparability.
The United States especially has much to gain from the
strengthening of the rule of law. Through a long succession of
Presidents, Secretaries of State and Defense, Chairmen of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Law of the Sea Delegation heads, we
held fast to the awareness that the Law of the Sea Convention
could make important contributions to this objective. I have no
doubt that the continuing force of our enduring interests will in
due course reinstate that perception.
23. Draft Final Act, supra note 2, res. I, para. 2.
24. Under article 308, paragraph 4, of the Convention, supra note 1, the rules
and regulations will take effect provisionally upon the entry into force of the Con-
vention, and they can thereafter be changed pursuant to article 162, paragraph
2(o) only by consensus. This means that the form in which the rules and regula-
tions emerge from the Preparatory Commission is critically important. See Draft
Final Act, supra note 2, res. L
APPENDIX
AGREEMENT CONCERNING INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS RELATING TO
POLYMETALLIC NODULES OF THE DEEP SEA BED
THE PARTIES TO THIS AGREEMENT:
- HAVING regard to investments made in exploration, research and other pio-
neer activities relating to the polymetallic nodules of the deep sea bed;
- NOTING the adoption by the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of
the Sea of a Convention on the Law of the Sea and of a Resolution Governing Pre-
paratory Investment in Pioneer Activities Relating to Polymetallic Nodules prior
to the entry into force of the Convention on the Law of the Sea, and the provision
of that Resolution concerning resolution of conflicts among pioneer operators;
- RECALLING the interim character of legislation with respect to deep sea bed
operations enacted by certain Parties;
- DESIRING to make appropriate provisions for avoiding overlaps in the areas
claimed for future pioneer activities in the deep sea bed and to ensure that, during
the interim period, such activities are carried out in an orderly and peaceful
manner;
- EMPHASIZING that this Agreement is without prejudice to the decisions of
the Parties with respect to the Convention on Law of the Sea adopted by the Third
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea;
- DESIRING also to avoid any discrimination among Parties in the implementa-
tion of this Agreement;
- DESIRING further to insure that adequate areas containing polymetallic nod-
ules remain available for operations by other states and entities in conformity
with international law;
HAVE AGREED AS FOLLOWS:
1. The object of the present Agreement is to facilitate the identification and reso-
lution of conflicts which may arise from the filing and processing of applications
for authorizations made by Pre-Enactment Explorers (PEEs) on or before March
12, 1982 under legislation in respect of deep sea bed operations enacted by any of
the Parties.
2. In the case of a conflict between the areas claimed in such applications, the
Parties shall afford the applicants adequate opportunity, and shall encourage
them, to resolve such conflict in a timely manner by voluntary procedures.
3. The Parties with whom applications for authorizations have been made by
PEEs on or before March 12, 1982 shall follow the procedures set out in Part I of
the Schedule hereto in respect of such applications.
4. The Parties shall consult together.
(a) with a view to coordinating and reviewing implementation of this
Agreement;
(b) before issuing any authorization under their respective laws relating to
deep sea bed operations;
(c) in regard to consideration of any arrangement to facilitate mutual
recognitions of such authorizations, it being understood that any such ar-
rangement shall not enter into force before January 1, 1983;
(d) before entering into any other bilateral or any multilateral arrangement
between themselves or any arrangement with other States, with respect
to deep sea bed operations.
5. In the event that any of the Parties with whom applications for authorizations
have been made by PEEs on or before March 12, 1982 enter into an agreement for
the mutual recognition of authorizations granted under their respective laws in re-
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spect of deep sea bed operations, the Parties concerned shall apply the procedures
and impose the requirements set out in Part 11 of the Schedule hereto.
6. To the extent permissible under national law, a Party shall maintain the confi-
dentiality of the coordinates of application areas and other proprietary or confi-
dential commercial information received in confidence from any other Party in
pursuance of cooperation under this Agreement in accordance with the principles
set out in Part EEI of the Schedule hereto.
7. The Parties shall settle any dispute arising from the interpretation or applica-
tion of this Agreement by appropriate means. The Parties to the dispute shall
consider the possibility of recourse to binding arbitration and, if they agree, shall
have recourse to it.
8. The Schedule hereto is an integral part of this Agreement and Part IV thereof
shall apply for the interpretation of this Agreement.
9. The Parties shall not enter into any supplementary international agreement in-
consistent with this Agreement.
10. This Agreement may be amended by written agreement of all the Parties.
11. This Agreement shall enter into force upon signature.
12. After entry into force of this Agreement, additional States may be invited to
accede to this Agreement at any time with the consent of all Parties.
13. Any Party may denounce this Agreement on 30 days' notice to the Govern-
ment of the United States of America, and in no case shall the denunciation have
effect before January 3, 1983.
DONE at Washington this second day of September, 1982, in the English, Ger-
man and French languages, all texts being equally authentic, in a single copy
which shall be deposited in the archives of the Government of the United States of






1. Each Party as provided in paragraph 3 of the Agreement shall forthwith inform
the other Parties of entities which have filed applications with it.
2. Any application filed on or before March 12, 1982 shall be deemed to be filed on
that date.
3. Each Party shall with all dispatch determine whether.
(a) each application fied with it fulfills its domestic requirements;
(b) the applicant is a PEE with respect to the area applied for (an applicant
filing on behalf of a PEE shall itself be deemed a PEE for that
application);
(c) the area is bounded by a continuous boundary;
(d) the area is reasonably compact.
4. Each Party shalh
(a) notify the other Parties of the results of the initial processing under para-
graph 3 above;
(b) with the other Parties establish the final list of applications to which this
Agreement applies;
(c) inform the other Parties whether the applicant has applied for the same
area, or substantially the same area, to one or more other Parties;
(d) if the applicant agrees, inform the other Parties of the coordinates of the
area specified in any application filed with it;
(e) endeavor to determine the exact locations of any conflicts.
5. No Party shall issue any authorization before January 3, 1983.
6. Where it is informed of the relevant coordinates, each Party shall notify each
of its applicants who is involved in a conflict that a conflict exists. Such notifica-
tion shall include coordinates identifying the areas in conflict and the identity of
each applicant with whom conflict has arisen.
7. 'Each Party shall ensure that domestic conflicts are resolved pursuant to its re-
spective domestic requirements. Upon agreement of the applicants, domestic con-
flicts may be resolved in accordance with the international conflict resolution
procedures specified in the Schedule. The Parties shall enter into consultations if
it appears that the resolution of a domestic conflict might affect the international
conflict resolution procedures, or vice versa.
8. (1) Each Party shall accept amendments to applications to which this Agree-
ment applies only if they:
(a) pertain to areas with respect to which the applicant is a PEE (the
area applied for in an amendment need not be adjacent to the area
applied for in the original application); and
(b) are made in order to resolve an existing conflict with respect to that
application.
(2) Each Party shall process any amendment filed pursuant to this paragraph
in accordance with the procedures described in the foregoing provisions
of this Part except that paragraphs 2, 3(c), 3(d), and 4(c) shall not apply
to amendments.
(3) Amendments filed under paragraph 8 of the Schedule shall be eligible for
mutual recognition in accordance with the terms of an agreement entered




9. (1) Where there is an international conflict, the Parties shall use their good
offices to assist the applicants to resolve the conflict by voluntary
procedures.
(2) Af within six months from the entry into force of an agreement between
the Parties referred to in paragraph 5 of the Agreement, notwithstanding
the good offices of the Parties, all applicants involved in an international
conflict have not resolved that conflict, or are not parties to a written
agreement submitting the conflict to a specified binding conflict resolu-
tion procedure, the conflict shall be resolved by binding arbitration in ac-
cordance with Appendices 1 and 2 if a Party so elects.
(3) The procedures provided in the Appendices shall commence ten days af-




10. In implementing the provisions of paragraph 6 of the Agreement, Parties shall
apply the following principles:
(a) The confidentiality of the coordinates of application areas shall be
maintained until any conflict involving such area is resolved and the rel-
evant authorization is issued, except on the basis of a demonstrated
need to know and adequate assurances that the confidentiality of the in-
formation shall be maintained by the recipient;
(b) The confidentiality of other proprietary or confidential commercial infor-
mation shall be maintained in accordance with domestic law as long as
such information retains its character as such.
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PART IV
DEFINITIONS
11. In this Agreement:
(a) "activities" means the undertakings, commitments of resources, investi-
gations, findings, research, engineering development, and other activities
relevant to the identification, discovery, and systematic analysis and
evaluation of polymetallic nodules and to the determination of the tech-
nical and economic feasibility of exploitation;
(b) "authorization" means any license, permit, or other authorization issued
under the national law of a Party which authorizes the holder to engage
in deep sea bed operations in a specified area or areas;
(c) "conflict" means the existence of more than one application or amend-
ment covered by this Agreement submitted by different applicants:
(1) whether filed with the same Party or with more than one Party; and
(2) in which the deep sea bed areas applied for overlap in whole or
part, to the extent of the overlap;
"international conflict" means a conflict arising from applications or
amendments filed with more than one Party; "domestic conflict" means
any other conflict;
(d) a "pre-enactment explorer" ("PEE") is an entity which was engaged,
prior to the earliest date of enactment of domestic legislation by any
Party, in deep sea bed polymetallic nodule exploration by substantial
surveying activity with respect to the area applied for; and
(e) "polymetallic nodules" means any deposit or accretion on or just below
the surface of the deep sea bed consisting of nodules which contain
manganese, nickel, cobalt, or copper.
APPENDIX 1
Arbitration Procedure
1. In this Appendix, "Party" means a Party to this Agreement which is also
concerned in the arbitration, and "other Party" includes any such Party or Parties.
2. The parties presenting the case shall seek to agree in writing within sixty
days after the expiry of the ten-day period provided by paragraph 9(3) of the
Schedule on three arbitrators, or, if they agree to have only one arbitrator, on that
one arbitrator.
3. Any Party may object to the choice of any arbitrator or arbitrators under
paragraph 2, by written notice received by the other Party within thirty days after
the expiry of the period provided by paragraph 2 above. Upon objection to any ar-
bitrator by a Party, tne other Party may, when three arbitrators have been chosen
under paragraph 2, object to either or both of the other arbitrators by written no-
tice received by the other Party within fifteen days after the expiry of the period
provided by the immediately preceding sentence.
4. If a Party objects to the choice of any arbitrator in accordance with para-
graph 3 or if an arbitrator becomes unable to act, the parties presenting the case
shall seek to agree on a replacement in writing within sixty days after receipt of
the notice of objection or after the date when the arbitrator becomes unable to act.
If agreement is reached, a Party may object to the choice of a replacement by
written notice received by the other Party within thirty days. If the parties
presenting the case have not reached agreement, or if a Party objects to the choice
of a replacement in accordance with this paragraph, the Secretary-General of the
Permanent Court of Arbitration shall appoint a replacement without delay.
5. If the Parties presenting the case fail to agree on three arbitrators (or an ar-
bitrator) within the period provided by paragraph 2, three arbitrators shall, on re-
quest of a Party, be appointed without delay by the Secretary-General of the
Permanent Court of Arbitration.
6. Any arbitrator appointed by the Secretary-General of the Permanent Court
of Arbitration shall not be a citizen of a Party, shall have international standing
and expertise, and shall have personal characteristics which place him in a neutral
position with respect to the subject of the dispute. The Secretary-General shall
not be confined to any particular list of arbitrators in making this selection. Ap-
pointments by the Secretary-General shall not be open to challenge.
7. Insofar as any matter is not dealt with by Appendix 2 and other relevant pro-
visions of this Agreement, the arbitrator or arbitrators shall, consistent with Ap-
pendix 2, be guided by the general principles of law as recognized by the Parties,
which, where the case is presented by a Party or Parties means the general princi-
ples of public international law (lex lata) as recognized by the Parties.
8. The arbitrator or arbitrators shall decide where he or they shall sit and shall,
in consultation with the parties presenting the case, adopt rules of procedure con-
sistent with this Appendix.
9. The case will be presented by a Party or by its applicants involved in the
conflict, at the option of the Party and each side of the case shall be represented
as it sees fit.
10. A Party may intervene as of right.
11. An arbitrator may not abstain from voting on the award. If there are three
arbitrators, their award shall be made by a majority vote.
12. The award of the arbitrator or arbitrators shall be rendered within one year
from the date of the final appointment of the arbitrator or arbitrators unless all
Parties or parties presenting the case otherwise agree or unless the arbitrator or
arbitrators for good cause extend the deadline for the making of the award for one
or more 30 day periods, in any case not to exceed 120 days.
The award shall be final and binding on the applicants involved in the conflict
and on the Parties and shall be enforced by the Parties. The applicants involved
in the conflict shall without delay file amendments to their applications consistent
with the arbitral award. Within two months of the date of the award, a Party or
any applicant represented in the arbitration may request an interpretation of the
award. Such interpretation shall be provided within four months of the request.
13. The expense of the arbitration, including the remuneration of the arbitra-
tors, shall be borne by the parties presenting the case. Unless the arbitrator or
arbitrators determine otherwise because of the particular circumstances of the
case, the parties presenting the case shall bear the expenses in equal shares.
14. If an applicant of a Party is involved in conflicts with two or more appli-
cants of two or more States Parties to this Agreement, every effort shall be made
to consolidate the arbitration proceedings.
APPENDIX 2
Principles for Resolution of Conflicts
1. In determining the issue as to which applicant involved in a conflict shall be
awarded all or part of each area in conflict, the arbitral tribunal shall find a solu-
tion which is fair and equitable, having regard, with respect to each applicant in-
volved in the conflict, to the following factors:
(a) the continuity and extent of activities relevant to each area in conflict and
the application area of which it is a part;
(b) the date on which each applicant involved in the conflict or predecessor
in interest or component organization thereof commenced activities at
sea in the application area;
(c) the financial cost of activities relevant to each area in conflict and to the
application area of which it is a part, measured in constant terms;
(d) the time when activities were carried out, and the quality of activities;
and
(e) such additional factors as the arbitral tribunal determines to be relevant,
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but excluding a consideration of the future plans of work of the appli-
cants involved in the conflict.
2. When considering the factors specified in paragraph 1, the arbitral tribunal
shall hear, and shall, except for purposes of apportionment pursuant to paragraph
3, limit its consideration to all evidence based on the activities specified in para-
graph 1, which were conducted on or before January 1, 1982, provided, however,
that an applicant must prove at-sea prospecting in the conflict area prior to June
28, 1980 as a pre-condition to presentation of further evidence to the arbitral tribu-
nal regarding activities in the conflict area.
3. In making its determination, the arbitral tribunal may award the entire area
in conflict to one applicant involved in the conflict, or the arbitral tribunal may ap-
portion the area among any or all of the applicants involved in the conflict. If, af-
ter applying the provisions of paragraph 1 of this Appendix, the arbitral tribunal
determines the area in conflict should be apportioned, then the arbitral tribunal
shall, to the maximuir extent practicable consistent with its application of those
provisions, apportion the area in a manner designed to satisfy the plan of work set
forth in the application of each applicant which is awarded part of the area.

